

Marked for Success??? The Winnipeg Core Area Initiative's Approach to Urban Regeneration

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Introduction

The Problem of Inner-City Decline

Major urban centres throughout the industrialised world reflect similar trends of physical, economic and social deterioration, along with population loss, in the inner city. Despite local differences, cities are shaped by many of the same conditions that affect urban environments. These conditions include augmenting deficits and accumulated debt burdens, devolutionary pressures in responsibility and financial aid, and the requirement to balance the increased need for services aimed at addressing urban problems against the willingness of citizens to pay increased levels of taxation.

It is within this context that the search for and introduction of strategies designed to remedy the problems faced by declining inner cities is of interest and import to government, academics and planning practitioners alike. The complexity of inner city decline has yielded an equally complex array of policy and programmatic responses in the quest to find a single best solution -- a magic formula -- for urban revitalisation.

Scope and Objective of Paper

This paper combines a review of existing literature on urban policy and practice with an analysis of a major Canadian urban planning intervention -- the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (CAI). Launched in 1981, the CAI was one of the nation's largest urban regeneration efforts, comprising \$196 million in expendi-

tures. Spanning a decade and reflecting unprecedented tri-level governmental cooperation, the CAI was considered to be a unique and notable experiment in public policy and drew considerable attention throughout North America and Europe.

The paper's objective is to contribute to the development of comprehensive, strategic and coherent policy formulation and practice in the area of urban regeneration by asking the question "What constitutes success in efforts to address inner city decline?" This question is answered through a survey of policy solutions derived from a literature search, and is illustrated through a review of the relative success or failure of the CAI as compared against this broader policy framework.

In this Introduction, Part I, the subject matter importance has been outlined and the purpose presented. In the remainder of the Introduction, the overall organizational structure of the paper is presented and the methodology explained. Part II introduces the notion of 'success' in urban regeneration efforts, and uses this as a conceptual framework within which meaningful urban policy can be established and an analysis of the CAI's effectiveness can be undertaken.

In Part III, a brief synopsis of inner-city problems is provided along with a description of the evolution of urban regeneration policy, as a theoretical backdrop to case analysis. Part IV outlines the political and socio-economic context within which the CAI was introduced, and provides an overview of the Initiative's scope of programming. Part V includes a detailed discussion of principles or critical success factors underlying effective urban revitalisation efforts. The extent to which the CAI embodied each of these critical success factors is explored. Special emphasis is accorded to the CAI's unique tri-partite model that constituted its structural framework. In Part VI, the focus is on evaluative enterprise in urban regeneration efforts. Recommended components of a comprehensive evaluative framework are identified and an evaluation of the CAI's relative success, including strengths and shortcomings, is undertaken. The notion of sustainability as it relates to urban revitalisation endeavours is highlighted in Part VII, and an examination is made of whether the impression left by the CAI can be characterised as lasting and strong. Finally, Part VIII draws concluding commentary in support of the paper's objective, and suggests what lessons can be learned from the CAI experience towards more informed policy approaches to ongoing inner city challenges.

Methodology

Data Sources

The methodology employs a combination of library research on urban revitalisation efforts throughout Europe and the western world, and a case study of the Winnipeg CAI. The case study comprises content analysis of various published

materials on the CAI, such as formal reports, newspaper accounts and census data. Two published surveys, of CAI beneficiaries and the public-at-large, also help to foster understanding of opinion and perception about inner city renewal in general and of the CAI specifically.

These primary data sources are enriched through interviews with individuals who were involved in some fashion with the CAI (see Appendix 1). Contributors reflect those who had senior administrative responsibilities in implementing CAI policy, individuals involved in evaluative reviews of the CAI, members of non-governmental agencies that were involved with the CAI on a sustained basis and interested academic observers. While interviews are limited in number, this is mitigated by the fact that the scope of commentary of several respondents reflected the ability to provide multiple-perspective input. It should be noted that viewpoints expressed by study participants reflect personal opinion only, and do not represent organisational or government positions. With respect to the reliability of information provided, an attempt was made to verify commentary of a factual nature through comparison with other written sources, while individual impressionistic data has been incorporated as such.

Use of a Case Study Approach

It is readily acknowledged that a case study that focuses upon a single urban regeneration initiative provides less basis for generalisation of research results. Notwithstanding, while experiences cannot be unconditionally transferred across jurisdictions, few cities are so unique that no lessons can be shared by them. Additionally, such a research design provides an opportunity for focused inquiry; that is, it allows one to learn more about less, rather than less about more.

The Notion of 'Success' in Urban Regeneration Efforts

The notion of 'success' as it pertains to urban revitalisation may be examined from two vantage points. First, what outcomes are considered to be reflective of effective urban restructuring efforts? Second, what common critical factors contribute to successful endeavours?

Outcome Measurements

In seeking to answer the question of what constitutes successful outcomes in urban regeneration efforts, the literature reviewed suggests an absence of consensus along with an apparent reluctance to articulate explicit criteria for judging success, perhaps attributable to the complex inter-relatedness of inner city problems. Outcome measurements, as part of an overall evaluative framework, are discussed in more detail in Part VI of this paper. In summary, commonly

used social, economic and environmental yardsticks of success include: physical development, economic investment, neighbourhood improvement, along with changes in inner city education, employment, income, crime rate, out-migration and resident perceptions.

The paradoxical questions of ‘success for whom?’ and ‘success, but at what price?’ must also be posed when examining policy or program effectiveness. To this end, a number of authors suggest that the physical redevelopment of inner cities does not necessarily correlate with the economic or social well-being of residents, and may in fact occur at their expense (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989; Wolman et al 1994; Goetz 1997).

Critical Success Factors

By whatever benchmarks ‘success’ is assessed, the concept clearly has numerous dimensions. While the literature reviewed reveals that there does not appear to be any one particular meta-model or universal formula within existing policy frameworks, governments have learned a great deal about how to facilitate urban regeneration over the last decade. A number of common themes stand out clearly and consistently recur as critical factors contributing to successful outcomes of urban regeneration efforts.

Principles or guidelines underlying effective urban regeneration endeavours are discussed in detail in Part V of this paper. In summary, the notion of ‘success’ as it pertains to inner city restructuring includes the critical factors below:

- ▶ an area-based approach to inner-city revitalisation;
- ▶ a multi-sectoral strategy that integrates physical, social and economic dimensions;
- ▶ a broad long-term perspective to planning and implementation;
- ▶ the presence of clearly defined objectives;
- ▶ a model or structural framework that supports the achievement of stated objectives;
- ▶ the pursuit of partnerships between government, the private sector and the community, with special emphasis on citizen participation;
- ▶ the development and implementation of coordinated information and monitoring systems, and
- ▶ recognition of the value of incremental change.

The above principles are not set forth as a panacea for inner city ills. Notwithstanding, these components of ‘success’, derived both from policy and practice, serve as a conceptual foundation upon which to build comprehensive and cohesive urban policy. As well, they serve as a useful conceptual framework within which Part V sets out to undertake a critical assessment of the CAI’s importance and effectiveness.

An Overview of Inner City Decline and Relevant Policy Evolution

A Synopsis of Inner City Problems

While it is not the intent of this paper to address either causes or characteristics of urban problems in detail, a basic understanding of these issues is helpful in describing the context within which various policy approaches to urban renewal have evolved and serves as a useful precursor to case analysis.

In years past, the 'inner city' was frequently defined in predominantly physical terms as the central core of urban regions. While such definition offered a clean, spatially and geographically precise means for assembling information about the inner city, it carried distinct disadvantages. Specifically, a spatial definition is static rather than dynamic, and is incapable of capturing the essential nature of the inner city in terms of the people who live there, the type of social and economic opportunities or lack thereof available to them and the pressures to which they are exposed (McKee 1977).

More recent literature attempts to characterise, rather than define, the inner city. A general and consensual image of inner cities across various nations may be summarised as follows. The inner city population is older, less educated, more frequently unemployed, poorer and more mixed ethnically than the suburban population (Bunting 1987; Kasarda 1993; OECD 1996). The former group has been labelled as "the urban underclass", reflecting their isolation from mainstream social, occupational and political institutions (Jencks and Peterson 1991). Social dysfunction and criminality are threaded through the social fabric. Inner city housing stock, as compared to suburban housing, tends to reflect older smaller dwelling units, lower rents and more overcrowding (Gibson and Langstaff 1982). Homelessness is commonplace. Inner city neighbourhoods more often than not lack access to basic amenities and community facilities enjoyed by suburban ones. In short, inner cities are typically portrayed as severely disadvantaged areas occupied by persistently disadvantaged groups.

The acute disparity between inner cities and areas of urban prosperity is seen to be attributable to various macro forces. Sassen (1991, 1994) believes that the spatial segregation and socio-economic polarisation of inner city populations is a result of the changing nature of employment within a global economy. The author points to a shift in emphasis to part-time and temporary jobs, a decline in job opportunities for low-skilled workers, and an increase in long-term unemployment. Within this scenario, the employment situation of marginal groups appears increasingly precarious. Other writings suggest that the character of inner cities has been shaped by socio-demographic changes including out-migration to the suburbs, upswings in immigration to core areas, and increased num-

bers of single elderly persons and single-parent families (OECD 1996). Fiscal restraint by governments is also advanced as a contributing factor to the creation of a 'new poor' in inner cities. Specifically, limits on public spending have resulted in a reduced resource base for social assistance programs and urban regeneration. On a micro level, discriminatory housing practices are seen to reinforce the spatial isolation of marginal groups (Massey et al 1994; van Vliet et al 1985).

The Evolution of Urban Policy Formulation

The problems of urban deprivation and the need for urban regeneration have been long-standing concerns of government. The policy responses developed to address these issues have clearly evolved over time, with creativity arguably being borne of necessity and with gradual consensus on approach being built through considerable debate, improved understanding and actual experience. A brief description of this evolution provides a basis for understanding critical success factors associated with urban revitalisation as well as for evaluating the CAI's efforts as an instrument of public policy.

Prior to the mid 1970s, urban policy in many countries tended to be highly sectoral in nature, with sharp lines of philosophical and operational demarcation between the economic and social facets of urban problems. This fragmented approach, in which government funded regeneration projects according to specific categories of need or problem, was often characterised by disparate foci and objectives and did not offer a comprehensive framework for addressing the growing complexity of urban issues.

The traditional single-sector methodology of urban policy development began to change to a more integrated approach during the 1980s. It has been argued that such change was largely due not to the presence of any grand strategic approach, but rather, to the reduction of federal funding and the devolution of responsibility for urban regeneration to provincial and municipal governments (OECD 1996).

The move towards a more integrated approach was also reflective of an increased understanding of the complexity, multiplicity and inter-relatedness of urban problems, and a corresponding acknowledgement that addressing these problems would require concurrent policy effort on several fronts. To illustrate, housing affordability is now seen to be related to the availability of jobs with adequate earning power, and the ability to obtain such employment is seen to be related to sufficient education (Gibson and Langstaff 1982; Gilderbloom and Wright 1993; Shlay 1995; OECD 1995).

Early urban regeneration efforts have sometimes been described as 'bricks and mortar' projects, with significant emphasis placed on the physical revitalisation of inner cities. While such emphasis was a highly visible, well-intentioned and understandable policy response to a highly visible manifestation of

urban deprivation; namely, substandard housing, its long-term return-on-investment was not deemed to be significant. Interestingly, the priority placed on the development of physical as opposed to human capital continues to surface as a subject of vigorous debate (Van Vliet 1997; Nenno 1997). On balance, however, recent urban regeneration initiatives have moved 'beyond the bulldozer', in growing recognition that true regeneration is only possible through redevelopment of an area's socio-economic as well as physical fabric.

An early policy debate centred around the relative merits of 'people-oriented' versus 'place-oriented' approaches to urban regeneration. The former approach advanced the argument of social justice towards the provision of universal social programs, while the latter maintained that well-coordinated multi-sectoral initiatives would produce a better return-on-investment dedicated to them. The 1980s witnessed an increasing move to area-based policy endeavours, supported by the thesis that if the problems of disadvantage are augmented by spatial concentration in inner cities, the failure to address these problems from a place-oriented perspective would result in significant costs to society.

Background and Overview of the CAI

The CAI's Context

In order for this paper to fulfill its objective of contributing to the development of informed urban regeneration policy, one must understand the context within which the CAI was introduced. To this end, it is both useful and necessary to:

- ▶ place Winnipeg into some larger context. Specifically, to what extent did Winnipeg share inner-city problems with other Canadian urban centres and to what extent was it different at the time of the CAI's inception?
- ▶ outline the specific economic and political milieu in Winnipeg that set the stage for the introduction of the CAI.

Winnipeg's Inner City Relative to those of Other Canadian Centres

In the broader context of distressed cities, Winnipeg shared a number of common themes of inner city problems with other national urban centres, but at the same time, reflected certain unique demographic characteristics that served to set the city apart from others. A review conducted by the Institute of Urban Studies compared data on thirteen selected Canadian metropolitan areas including Winnipeg from 1971 to 1986, and is instructive in this regard (Charette 1990). With respect to population, the decline in Winnipeg's inner city population (10.0 %) during this time period was not as severe as compared against some other

centres (13.6 % on average). However, while 1981 to 1986 reflected a turnaround period in population decline in most Canadian urban centres (5.1 % increase on average), Winnipeg's gain in inner city population was among the lowest of cities examined (3.3 %).

While the proportion of single-parent families increased by varying degrees in all cities surveyed, the increase in Winnipeg was among the highest (26.7 %) and was perhaps reflective of the city's growing native population. Although inner city incomes increased (with wide variation) on the whole across Canada, Winnipeg was one of only two cities that witnessed a decrease in median income. Additionally, while the gap between inner and non-inner city income widened overall across most urban centres, this growing disparity was most pronounced in Winnipeg. The incidence of poverty within Winnipeg's inner city was, in fact, five times greater than the city average (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1992). Education and labour force participation data also reveal that Winnipeg's inner city lagged behind other Canadian centres in growth and improvement (Stewart 1993c). Winnipeg's inner city housing stock was seriously deteriorating, and evidenced one of the highest incidences (40 %) of distressed housing among Canadian cities (Institute of Urban Studies 1990a; Decter and Kowall 1990).

A Profile of the CAI's Economic and Political Context

As a historically important manufacturing and service centre, Winnipeg was commonly referred to as "the gateway to the west" and occupied a pre-eminent position over other primary urban prairie centres from the start of the century until 1950 (Artibise 1979). The city of Winnipeg was viewed as the engine of Manitoba's economy, since the city's population (approximately 600,000) represented 60 % of the entire province.

From this period of status and prosperity, however, Winnipeg began dropping in size relative to other major Canadian centres and in relative importance to other western cities. In the 1970s, Manitoba's economy was flagging, ranking eighth through tenth among the nation for a number of years. By the late 1980s, having dropped to seventh place nationally, Winnipeg reflected a condition of no growth during a time when the majority of other Canadian urban cities were growing at an unprecedented rate. Perhaps more important than the absolute decline in Winnipeg's annual growth rate was the serious decline in the city's core area following World War II (Levin 1984; Decter and Kowall 1990). Changing investment patterns that favoured business development in suburban areas no doubt contributed to erosion of the economic vitality of the inner city (Canada-Manitoba-Winnipeg Tripartite Agreement 1986; Leo 1995).

In order to appreciate the particular policy approach taken to address Winnipeg's inner city decline, it is necessary to understand the political context surrounding the CAI's inception. The CAI was conceived almost ten years after

the creation of Unicity, a form of 'grassroots' government structure, that replaced the previous Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg. With the establishment of Unicity in 1972, Winnipeg became the first major Canadian urban centre to move beyond a split-level form of metropolitan government to a singular administration for the entirety of its metropolitan area (Artibise 1977).

The political environment in 1980 represented a unique and conducive window of opportunity within which to launch an unprecedented cooperative attack on Winnipeg's inner city decline. The federal government's interests arose from a desire to improve Manitoba's failing economy. Based on the belief that a turnaround in the provincial economy was only possible through an about-face in Winnipeg's inner city decline, the CAI was viewed from a federal perspective as a policy instrument for regional economic development. While the provincial government had been involved in a number of revitalisation efforts during the 1970s, a decade later it was clear that traditional approaches were inadequate to address Winnipeg's inner city problems. The municipal government inarguably had the most to gain from a tri-level approach to urban regeneration. Although Winnipeg's administrative structure was dominated by a largely suburban-based council, city councillors quickly recognised that the potential ability of a joint effort by three levels of government far exceeded that of the financial capabilities of any one level alone, and held the promise of long-term benefits for all areas of the city.

The political impetus behind the notion of the CAI essentially rested in the person of Lloyd Axworthy, then the federal Minister for Employment and Immigration. Axworthy's riding included Winnipeg's inner city area and his Institute for Urban Studies had, in fact, conducted numerous studies of decline in the city's core area and its attendant social problems.

In considering contextual factors, it has been suggested that the CAI arose as a "unique constellation of people and events" (Kiernan quoted in Stewart 1993c: 86). If this is true, it may be argued on the one hand that the chance combination of time- and location-specific circumstances and personalities preclude replicability of the CAI model in other jurisdictions. On the other hand, this paper argues that, to the extent that the CAI reflected common principles underlying successful urban regeneration efforts, lessons can be learned towards informed urban policy initiatives in other times and places.

Overview of the CAI

While other cooperative efforts in the form of urban 'mega-projects' had been undertaken in Canada, none reflected the tremendous breadth and scope of the CAI. Launched in 1981, the Initiative was a coordinated, \$196 million tri-governmental endeavour intended to address long-standing problems in an approximately ten-square mile area of Winnipeg's inner-city encompassing nearly 100,000 people. Its substantive mandate combined the themes of economic

development, employment and training, and physical revitalisation of inner city neighbourhoods. Embarked on initially as a five-year revitalisation project, the CAI's \$96 million budget encompassed thirteen cost-shared programs and over one thousand projects. In 1986, the Initiative was extended in 1986 for an additional five-year term, with a \$100 million budget supporting a similarly complex array of programs and projects (Tables 1 and 2).

TABLE 1 CAI I Overview of Programs

Program Name	Budget (\$m)
Employment/affirmative action	9,500
Housing	13,062
Community improvement area	5,870
Community facilities	6,000
Community service	5,300
Industrial development/small business assistance	11,938
North Portage/Ellice revitalisation	13,180; 3,015
CNR east yards	8,101
Historic Winnipeg	4,900
Neighbourhood main streets	4,405
Management/ consultation/ public information	5,427
Total	96,000

Source: Adapted from Clatworthy, Stewart J. 1988. *Summaries of the Final Evaluations: Winnipeg Core Area Agreement, 1981-1986*. Winnipeg Core Area Initiative.

TABLE 2 CAI II – Overview of Programs

Sector I	Entrepreneurial and Strategic Site Development	Budget (\$m)
Program		
1.	Industrial and entrepreneurial support	4.0
2.	Exchange district redevelopment	9.0
3.	East yard redevelopment	20.0
4.	Riverbank enhancement	5.0
5.	Strategic capital projects	13.0
Subtotal		51.0
Sector II	Neighbourhood and Community Revitalisation	
Program		
6.	Neighbourhood and community development	16.0
7.	Inner city foundation	1.0
8.	Housing	10.5
9.	Training and employment	12.0
10.	Neighbourhood main street and small business	5.0
Subtotal		44.5

Sector III Management and Coordination		
Program		
11.	Central administration	2.8
12.	Public information and programming	1.3
13.	Evaluation	4.0
	Subtotal	4.5
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	Total	100.0

Source: *Winnipeg Core Area Initiative*. 1986. Winnipeg Core Area Initiative Canada-Manitoba Subsidiary Agreement for the Development of the Winnipeg Core Area. *Schedule B*.

Principles Underlying Successful Urban Regeneration Efforts

This section attempts to articulate those principles, derived both from policy and practice that are seen to be critical success factors in urban regeneration. Each principle is briefly reviewed and coupled with an assessment of the degree to which the principle was embodied by the Core Area Initiative.

An Area-Based Approach

Overview

Lessons taken from the books of international planning reassert the importance of an area-based approach to the economic and social revitalisation of inner cities. Such primacy does not refute the value of universal education, employment, housing and social assistance programs; rather, it emphasizes the need for thoughtfully focused initiatives to mitigate the cumulative costs of neglect.

The CAI Experience

The CAI reflected an area-based approach to urban revitalisation. Specifically, it was seen to represent the application of a comprehensive regional development plan to Winnipeg's disadvantaged inner city (Clatworthy and Associates 1990).

A Multi-Sectoral Strategy

Overview

Successful urban regeneration projects are predicated on the recognition that they

must reflect a comprehensive multi-sectoral approach that integrates elements of physical, social and economic revitalisation (Van Vliet 1997). The holistic thinking engendered through this approach helps to ensure cost-effectiveness through more consistent decisions and the elimination of duplication. Further, a multi-sectoral approach is seen to have synergistic effects, in which the sum of partial impacts extends wider and faster than the whole of single-sector initiatives.

The CAI Experience

The CAI evidenced a comprehensive multi-sectoral approach to revitalisation in the sense that the inner city's physical, economic and social problems were to be addressed simultaneously. Initiative programs were designed and executed across a policy spectrum of tremendous breadth, and included housing, neighbourhood improvement, community services, education, training, employment, business development, heritage building recycling, and large-scale mixed-use commercial development. Program delivery was intended to be mutually supportive, in that activities under the auspices of one program would contribute not only to the achievement of that program's goals, but as well, to overall objectives. The CAI's diversity encompassed over 30 individual program areas and 1000 individual projects. Its scope of interventions, coupled with a strong multi-sectoral emphasis, gave it a synergy not always present in other Canadian regeneration efforts (Stewart 1993b; Interview Leo 1998).

A Broad Long-Term Perspective

Overview

Research shows that there is a need to foster not only a broader, but also, a longer-term strategic perspective to urban regeneration. While distinct neighbourhoods, such as inner cities, are believed to be the most appropriate unit for policy design and program delivery, the need to link inner city policy to the development of city-wide strategies is also emphasized (Krumholz 1997). Some authors caution that a community-only focus may produce an insular orientation (Van Vliet 1997). Others raise the question of equity in the allocation of resources to inner cities at the expense of other areas (Vale 1997; Goetz 1997). Perhaps it is important to distinguish between the requirement for a grandiose strategy, which runs the risk of rejection or "paralysis by analysis," and an effective vision for change, developed with input from all major elements in the

community and broad enough to foster acceptance (Artibise 1983).

The CAI Experience

A definitive link between inner city planning policy and city-wide strategies was notably absent in the CAI, arguably diminishing its potential for success. It has been suggested that the municipal government in particular did not appear to have a clear long-term vision of what they wanted for Winnipeg's core area or for the city as a whole (Artibise 1983; Interview Leo 1998). The Initiative has been described as more project than planning-focused (Interview August 1998) with policy development and implementation occurring in a somewhat fragmented and isolated manner. Albeit unintended or unforeseen, some municipal policies, such as development incentives for suburban areas, were seen to contribute directly to inner city decline. The perception exists that planning which did take place was dominated by fairly narrow interests and reflected a largely one-sided commercial or corporate vision of what Winnipeg should be.

Clearly Defined Objectives

Overview

An essential ingredient in any successful urban regeneration endeavour is the degree to which problems are clearly defined and objectives articulated. Where objectives are specific -- for instance, reducing out-migration from the inner city, decreasing crime -- jurisdictions have realised considerable success (Stewart 1993a).

The CAI Experience

The CAI's overall mandate was to reverse the physical, social and economic deterioration of Winnipeg's inner city (North Portage Development Corporation 1990). Within this framework, the CAI had three over-arching objectives including: job training and placement, community revitalisation and economic development. It is widely perceived that while the CAI's comprehensive scope was one of its primary strengths, it was also a weakness (Kiernan 1987; Clatworthy and Associates 1990; Interview August and Clatworthy 1998). Specifically, it can be argued that the breadth and generality of the CAI's objectives were at odds with the extent of inner city decay and available organisational and financial resources. These objectives also served to raise unrealistically high expectations. Perhaps the development of more specific goals would have helped to sharpen overall vision, focus program activity and

resources, shape evaluative efforts and enhance the probability of sustainable successful outcomes.

A Model or Structural Framework Supportive of Goal Attainment

Overview

Emphasis on multi-sectoral approaches and partnerships in urban regeneration points to a corresponding need for new approaches to policy development and implementation and calls existing governance structures into question.

While the consensus that single-sector policies are clearly incongruent with complex urban problems has existed for at least a decade, it is interesting to note that a multi-sectoral philosophy is only rarely embodied in current government structure. Some authors nevertheless believe that inevitable political struggles over policy development have, in some instances, led to the evolution of a more inclusive style of local politics (Judd and Parkinson 1990).

Wide variations among jurisdictions exist in the determination of which organisation assumes a lead role in urban revitalisation and in the associated administrative structures established. On balance, research suggests that local level agencies are most likely to be successful at overcoming inter-disciplinary barriers, at establishing holistic visions, and at integrating urban regeneration policies and programs into a cohesive framework.

Evolving governance arrangements including partnerships and citizen participation suggest that successful urban regeneration efforts necessitate a blending of two approaches to policy development and implementation. Specifically, a 'top-down' approach would see plans emerging from federal or provincial governments, while a 'bottom-up' approach would draw heavily on the input of local groups and residents. The literature reviewed herein notes that while each approach has been utilised with varying degrees of success, a combined approach is relatively untested and would require ongoing refinement through actual experience.

With respect to partnerships, research suggests that the structure, composition, duration, scope and method of operation should be based upon local conditions, including the nature and scope of local urban problems and the availability and interest of stakeholder groups. Experience shows that while at the outset, the majority of partnerships focus on short-term agendas for specific areas, they may evolve into more lasting institutionalised entities concerned with longer-range revitalisation goals (Van Vliet 1997).

The CAI Experience

Popular opinion would hold that the CAI emerged from a unique combination

of political circumstances and personalities that served as a supportive framework and initially suffused the Initiative with vision, zeal and strong leadership (Kiernan 1987; Stewart 1993a; Leo 1995).

The CAI's management and program delivery structure reflected several unique features that served to distinguish it from other urban regeneration efforts. First, while a number of other contemporary North American urban revitalisation projects were considered noteworthy, the CAI's combination of substantive breadth and tri-governmental structure caused it to be seen by some as one of the most ambitious, comprehensive and innovative efforts ever undertaken on the continent (Kiernan 1987; Decter and Kowall 1990).

Second, the CAI's fundamental principle of trilateralism, in which each level of government was an equal partner not only in cost-sharing but, as well, in decision-making, was a distinctive trait. The tri-partite model is worthy of detailed examination, in that elements of the model can provide valuable instruction to future urban revitalisation endeavours. While there are mixed views respecting the efficacy of the CAI's tri-partite structure in carrying out its mandate, there would appear to be consensus regarding the need for and logic of a management structure capable of addressing inner city issues that cut across governmental jurisdictions. It has been argued, in fact, that intergovernmental partnerships are not only feasible and advantageous, but are certain to become increasingly essential vehicles as the complexity of urban problems continues to escalate.

On the plus side, the CAI's tri-partite structure afforded the effort legitimacy, offered some degree of protection from transitory political and fiscal priorities, and expanded the available base of expertise. Private sector investors, being courted as partners in Initiative programs, also found some security in the model. The model's emphasis on equality in decision-making was seen by some as an effective vehicle for binding the three levels of government to each other and to their common objective of revitalisation, as it enhanced understanding of inter-jurisdictional issues without the restrictions of narrow departmental mandates and fostered more responsible expenditure of resources (Stewart 1993b). The Initiative's formal Tripartite Agreement, in particular, was seen to provide a valuable framework for conflict resolution and for resource re-allocation based upon changing priorities. The establishment of a Core Area Office, which served as a local storefront of program administration, has been widely praised for bringing the Initiative to the local community level (Institute of Urban Studies 1990a).

On the negative side, the CAI's tripartite structure was viewed by some as cumbersome, bureaucratic and frustrating. Community Inquiry hearings found the CAI's management structure wanting in terms of openness, flexibility and accountability (Institute of Urban Studies 1990a). The argument arose during these hearings that the introduction of agencies such as the North Portage Development Corporation and the Forks Renewal Corporation under the CAI's umbrella essentially created a fourth level of decision-making and bureaucracy.

Some authors suggest that the requirement for unanimity in decision-making may, at times, have resulted in less than ideal compromises (Stewart 1993b). The model has also been criticised as offering a façade behind which respective levels of government could hide, although there appears to be little evidence to support this claim (Stewart 1993b).

Despite the diversity of opinion expressed above, there appears to be a widely-held perception that the CAI's tri-lateral management structure operated more effectively during its initial five-year, as opposed to its renewed, term (Decter and Kowall 1990; Interview Clatworthy 1998). The CAI's first term was characterised by a positive political will, a spirit of collective ownership and purpose, a significant degree of goal consensus, considerable capacity for flexibility and adaptability, and an ability to develop innovative alternatives to current government programming (Clatworthy and Associates 1990; Decter and Kowall 1990). These elements, seen as essential in managing the breadth and depth of the CAI's undertaking, are thought to have waned over the course of the renewed term. Their dissipation has been attributed to the departure of key individuals involved in the CAI's inception and the gradual diffusion of financial and programmatic responsibilities from the CAI Office to line departments (Interview Clatworthy 1998; Interview August 1998). The result was more isolated, bureaucratic and parochial priorities and interests competing with the CAI's over-arching goals. In fairness, however, there is perhaps a time horizon associated with massive undertakings like the CAI, after which it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain focus, impetus and commitment.

On the question of whether the CAI's form and function fostered a more inclusive style of local politics, opinion, albeit limited, would seem to indicate that the Initiative was quite effective at promoting inter-governmental cooperation. To a lesser extent, evidence also suggests that intra-governmental or inter-departmental cooperation increased as a result of the CAI (Clatworthy and Associates 1990).

While a review of the CAI does not appear to indicate which level of government assumed a lead role, opinion is clear that in the absence of a tripartite model, the municipal government lacked the vision, fiscal power, jurisdiction and programmatic capability to address inner city problems (Institute of Urban Studies 1990a).

With respect to policy development and implementation, the CAI largely utilised a 'top-down' approach, with plans emerging mainly from central as opposed to local agencies. Consensus from the 1990 Community Inquiry, however, clearly called for greater decentralisation of future programming (*ibid.*). This view would seem to be supported by evidence that, where responsibility was vested closest to program users, more effective and responsive interventions were seen to occur (Stewart 1993b).

While the CAI's structure, composition and scope were appropriately reflective of local urban problems, it can be argued that the availability and interest of stakeholder groups was not adequately taken into account. Community

Inquiry hearings emphasized that the wealth of knowledge and organisational skills within the local community was by and large untapped by the CAI.

The Pursuit of Partnerships

Overview

The importance of partnerships in urban regeneration efforts is consistently recognised. With respect to the development and implementation of multi-sectoral policy, partnerships between government, private industry, voluntary organisations and the community are viewed as particularly critical. From a financial perspective, the consolidation of multiple funding sources (including federal/provincial/municipal dollars and the leveraging of private sector investments) serves to reduce a project's financial vulnerability and becomes increasingly attractive and important in the face of reduced resources from traditional public sector sources. From an operational perspective, partnerships help to rationalise efforts, integrate expertise and promote stakeholder commitment.

Community involvement is seen to play a critical and growing role in urban regeneration efforts. Citizen participation is, in fact, often at the forefront of urban revitalisation policy objectives, instruments and evaluation. Numerous authors suggest that the process of citizen participation is as important as the product, fostering responsibility, capacity-building and long-term commitment to project success (Medoff Sklar 1994; Tulloss 1995; Halpern 1995; Bratt 1997). Jensen et al (1970) relate that urban renewal initiatives developed without adequate resident involvement often arouse considerable opposition. Van Vliet (1997) emphasizes that resident participation must be meaningful, empowering them with genuine responsibilities during all phases of the development process. While there has been significant success using this approach, it is not without challenges. First, resident groups are often too under-trained or under-funded to contribute effectively. Second, the process of involving citizens that are unmotivated or alienated is never easy.

The CAI Experience

Although the CAI's philosophical and operational framework was conducive to establishing productive partnerships between government, private industry, voluntary organisations and the community, it proved to be more effective in alliance-building with the first three entities than the last. Multiple funding sources created through the CAI's tri-governmental partnership coupled with the leveraging of private sector investments accorded the Initiative a degree of financial stability and expanded its base of expertise.

Disparity between CAI policy intent and execution was evident, however, in the area of citizen participation. While Kiernan (1987) feels that the CAI effectively provided for decentralised, community-based decision-making and program delivery, and while CAI-sponsored publications relate that resident involvement in planning inspired confidence (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1992), the balance of opinion would clearly suggest that community input was sought on an after-the-fact basis and that opportunities for significant participation were essentially efforts at co-optation used to legitimise the Initiative at anticipated points of renewal. The main exception to this rule may be the store-front nature of the Core Area Office, that fostered meaningful exchange with the community that otherwise may not have existed. Consistent but unanswered calls were made for the CAI to broaden its partnership model to include much greater emphasis on citizen participation (Results Group 1985; Social Planning Council 1991; Interview Lezubski 1998). In such an expanded partnership, the appropriate role of government was identified as one of leadership and facilitation through political commitment, technical and financial support.

Coordinated Information and Monitoring Systems

Overview

The need for comprehensive coordinated information and monitoring systems is seen as a key ingredient in developing effective urban revitalisation policy. Law et al (1988) propose that a system of "urban intelligence" is required, through which planning bodies become aware of changes in an area, monitor a diverse range of indicators, and develop appropriate strategies and interventions. Although there have been significant advances in the collection and utilisation of data in recent years, multi-dimensional data and impact analysis are noted as two major areas that are sometimes deficient. It is recommended that traditional 'hard' data on urban conditions (such as housing and employment) should be supplemented by periodic qualitative evaluations of social and environmental conditions in inner cities, as well as by ongoing monitoring of community opinion.

The CAI Experience

The CAI's information and monitoring systems, while well-intended, may be seen to fall short of a comprehensive evaluative framework. It is true that during the planning phase, extensive analytical research was undertaken to establish a

database of physical, demographic and economic indicators of the inner city (Levin 1980). It is also true that a number of evaluations were undertaken during and after the Initiative's first and second terms. One may question, however, if the right information was sought through evaluative efforts and based on the answer to that question, how helpful evaluative data was in informing policy development and implementation. The need for such a query appears to be confirmed by the expressed views of core area residents that many inner-city initiatives did not make a 'difference' to residents. Specifically, they believed that the link between research and policy implementation needed to be strengthened; that there was a need for more qualitative and community-based research to balance and complement data from quantitative methods (Charette 1993).

Recognition of the Value of Incremental Change

Overview

A fundamental principle of informed urban policy is the need to recognise that successful inner city regeneration does not occur overnight. The securing and sustaining of required funding and the unfolding of citizen participation are but two examples of elements that require significant effort. Experience has shown that, in cases of successful urban revitalisation efforts, fifteen years or more is not uncommon before turnaround becomes evident. While progress clearly does not follow a linear path, important lessons may be learned along the way. Several authors suggest that searching for meta-solutions is almost certainly time wasted; that what is required is, in fact, incremental change, on a small trial-and-error scale, in our institutional policies, processes and forms (Epstein 1974; Jencks 1991).

The CAI Experience

The CAI clearly recognised that successful urban regeneration does not occur overnight. The CAI's failure to achieve its stated objectives within its original five-year term may be seen to be reflective, not of deficiencies per se within the Initiative itself, but rather, of a significant underestimation of the depth of physical, social and economic decline in the inner city and the corresponding degree of effort required to address these problems.

Evaluative Enterprise in Urban Regeneration

Components of a Comprehensive Evaluative Framework

In and of itself, the development and implementation of comprehensive evaluation systems can be considered to be a critical element in the pursuit of successful urban regeneration policy. Evaluative methodology across jurisdictions has evolved from reliance on census data toward more timely, specific and objective measures for assessing program effectiveness. Indicators used to monitor, measure and compare social, economic and environmental conditions include: education, housing condition and tenure, out-migration (from inner cities), employment, income, and crime rate. Methodological developments place emphasis on cross-sectional as well as longitudinal studies and qualitative research (Peattie 1983; Van Vliet 1985). Both old and new opinion appears to support the importance of local perception in evaluating the success of urban regeneration endeavours (Wirth 1947; Artibise 1983).

Judd and Parkinson (1990) highlight the importance of assessing the role of leadership in the context of overall evaluation. Specifically, the authors see the skill with which leaders harness resources including money, goodwill, legislation and class relations available to them as a critical component of leadership capacity.

An Evaluation of the CAI's Relative Success

In evaluating any urban regeneration endeavour, it is important to recognise success stories, and indeed, the CAI offers a number of such accounts. At the same time, informed decision-making must also be based on a recognition of how policies and programs fall short, and the CAI's relative shortcomings provide invaluable learning in that regard.

Various evaluative studies on the CAI have attempted to address the issue of what constitutes success. Several authors suggest that perhaps the clearest evidence of the CAI's success was its renewal for a further five years, with an infusion of an additional \$100 million by three levels of government (Kiernan 1987; Decter and Kowall 1990). While the Initiative's renewal inarguably underscores its political success, clearly political success should not be the sole or even primary measure of the effectiveness of any urban revitalisation effort.

Typically, the CAI's impacts are examined in terms of selected dimensions including: physical development, economic investment, neighbourhood improvement, education, employment, income and changes in resident perceptions. Interestingly, evaluative data along these dimensional axes is often presented in terms of qualitative generalities, or in terms of inputs (for example, dollars infused) and outputs (for example, number of program graduates), rather than outcomes. Longitudinal and cross-sectional studies, along with specifically focused qualitative research, would appear to be in the minority. From a

program evaluation perspective, such analysis stops short of providing a true picture of the CAI's relative success.

The following overview (see Table 3), spanning a ten-year period from the CAI's inception through to 1991 census data, examines various indicators of physical, social and economic well-being within and between the inner city, non-inner city areas and Winnipeg as a whole. Even a cursory review of such data is instructive, in that it reveals that a number of distressed conditions continued to prevail in Winnipeg's inner city, and in some cases -- unemployment, poverty and criminal offences -- worsened over the decade. Moreover, the disparity between inner city and non-inner city residents became more acute over time on all indicators except education. While it is true that individual indicators cannot be examined meaningfully in isolation, and it is also true that positive or negative changes in these benchmarks cannot be directly or solely attributable to the CAI, the composite picture painted by this data may speak to the CAI's relative success or failure within the context of other micro and macro forces.

First, while inner city education levels improved slightly, the percentage of inner city residents with less than grade nine education was still 150 % greater than that of non-inner city residents and 91 % greater than that of Winnipeg citizens. Second, there continued to be a marked contrast in housing tenure, with the percentage of transient renters in the inner city 101 % and 75 % higher than that for non-inner city areas and the City of Winnipeg respectively. Third, the labour force participation rate in the inner city was 11 % less than that of non inner city residents and 9 % less than that of Winnipeggers in general. More

TABLE 3 A Comparative Overview of Physical, Social and Economic Indicators for Winnipeg's Inner City, Non- Inner City Areas and Winnipeg as a Whole

Indicator	Inner-City		Non Inner-City		Winnipeg Total	
	1981	1991	1981	1991	1981	1991
Education (% of population below grade 9)	26	20	13	8	16	11
Housing - Tenure (% own / rent)	34.4/ 65.6	33.7/ 66.3	65.1/ 34.8	67/ 33	57.8/ 42.1	60/ 39.5
Labour Force Participation Rate	62.1	59.3	69.3	70	67.7	68
Unemployment Rate	7.4	15.1	4.6	8	5.2	9
Average Household Income (\$)	22616	32000	35054	51000	32130	49000
% of Private Households Below Low Income Cutoff	36.2	44.3	17	15.5	21	21
Total Criminal Code Offences	18142	21834	48054	48826	66196	70660

Sources: Statistics Canada 1981 and 1991 Census data. Custom Service Production; Social Planning Council 1981 and 1991; Winnipeg Police Service Annual Statistical Reports 1981 and 1991; Institute of Urban Studies. 1990c. A Community-Based Needs Consultation of the Inner-City: Summary Report.

startlingly, the unemployment rate in the inner city increased by 104 % and was

dramatically higher (89 % and 68 % respectively) than corresponding rates for non-inner city areas and for Winnipeg as a whole. Fourth, average inner city income continued to be significantly lower than that in non-inner city areas and Winnipeg proper (37 % and 35 % respectively), with the gap widening over time. Even more disturbing was an 8.1 % increase in inner city households falling below the 'poverty line', resulting in inner city poverty levels being significantly higher (28.8 % and 23.3 % respectively) than those for non-inner city areas and the City in its entirety. Winnipeg's inner city has, in fact, been identified as "one of the nation's worst centres of poverty (McKinnon 1998), in which nearly one-half of the residents live below the poverty level (Khan 1998).

Although parallel comparative data is not available on welfare recipients, it is noteworthy that in 1981, municipal social assistance comprised 16.6 % of total provincial claims. In 1991, this figure rose dramatically to 42.5 % of provincial claims, with the inner city comprising 47 % of all social assistance cases. This data begs the premature optimism of Kiernan's claim that, through CAI interventions, "hundreds of people have been removed from the City's welfare rolls" (Kiernan 1986: 320). Respecting public safety, criminal code offences in Winnipeg's inner city comprised 27 % of the city's total in 1981, rising to 31 % in 1991. Interestingly, in a 1989 study of public opinion, crime was seen by inner city and non-inner city residents alike (85 % of respondents) to be the most pressing problem facing Winnipeg's core area (Results Group 1989).

Statistical evidence would suggest that the CAI did not fulfill its overall mandate to reverse the physical, social and economic deterioration of Winnipeg's inner city. Current opinions would seem to support the notion that the core area is in worse shape today than at the CAI's inception (Interview Leo 1998; Interview Lezubski 1998). In fairness, however, one must question if the CAI's mandate was realistic given its relatively short ten-year life-span as compared to the depth and extent of existing urban problems. One must also keep the Initiative's capacity to effect major or sustained change in context. While the CAI's investment of approximately \$20 million a year in the inner city may seem substantive, the following points are noteworthy. First, the total annual income of inner city residents was estimated at over \$1 billion in 1992 (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1992). Second, Initiative funds represented less than two percent of the civic economy (*ibid.*). Third, today's cost of a single arena or bridge would roughly equal the CAI's five-year budget (Interview August 1998).

With respect to local perception as an evaluative element of the CAI's success, the following points are of interest. First, public opinion, as surveyed in 1989 and comprised of both inner city and non-inner city residents, strongly reflected an over-emphasis by the CAI on large-scale building projects at the expense of housing and social programs directed specifically at core area residents (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1992). Second, while there was a slight positive shift in the attitude of inner city residents regarding the relative condition of their neighbourhood over time, they were still fifteen times more likely than non-core residents to rate their neighbourhood as poor (Clatworthy

1987). A 1994 survey of public opinion in Canadian prairie inner cities, in fact, accorded Winnipeg one of the lowest ratings of quality of life (Charette 1994). These sentiments appear to be at odds with those expressed by others that “the cumulative effect of the CAI’s changes was a palpable transformation in the perception of Winnipeg’s inner city” (Kiernan 1987: 28) and that “most significant of all, the CAI influenced a changing attitude about the core” (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1992: 24).

An assessment of the CAI’s leadership capacity reveals that the Initiative was particularly skilled at harnessing available financial resources. Notwithstanding, while various evaluative studies clearly identify the magnitude of Agreement funds and the level of complementary funding, the total dollar value of private sector contributions is unclear (Grecke and Reid 1990; Interview Leo 1998). Varying claims that the CAI directly catalysed over one-half billion dollars worth of public and private sector investment (Kiernan 1987; Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1992) and that the City of Winnipeg was able to multiply its own investment by over eight times (Dexter and Kowall 1990) have and continue to be debated. The claim that that CAI reinforced confidence in the private-sector investment community and reintroduced private spending in the core area is, however, indisputable. As successful as the Initiative was at leveraging funding, one of its obvious failings was the absence of an advocacy component that could transform program experience into innovative legislative reform. Aside from some early attempts to decentralise child welfare services, the CAI was not seen to fulfill its potential as a catalyst for legislative and systemic reform (Results Group 1989). It may be argued that the CAI was only moderately successful at harnessing available human resources, goodwill and class relations. Specifically, the CAI’s lack of utilisation of local community expertise is particularly notable in this regard.

On a conceptual level, the CAI attempted to achieve philosophical and budgetary balance between its objectives of physical, economic and social development. In practice, however, a continuing tension surrounded the relative priorities assigned to ‘bricks and mortar’ projects versus disparity relief. This gap between policy direction and policy implementation became more obvious as the Initiative progressed. On the plus side, the CAI’s housing program was one of the most ambitious efforts undertaken in Canada and its contribution to improvement in the inner city’s housing stock is widely acknowledged (Institute of Urban Studies 1990a). At the same time, however, program uptake was often uneven, with repair activities, for example, among rental dwellings, lower-income families and older neighbourhoods falling far short of actual need (Clatworthy and Associates 1990; Interview Lezubski 1998). Two major spin-offs of the CAI; namely, the North Portage Development Corporation and the Forks Development Corporation, provoked mixed opinion. On the one hand, they were seen as the catalyst for redevelopment which infused over \$300 million of investment in downtown Winnipeg. They also had both a high awareness and identification rate among the citizens of Winnipeg (Results Group

1989). On the other hand, these projects were subject to the criticism that although they stimulated downtown economic development, they did little to address the poverty, unemployment and quality of life of inner city residents (Ad Hoc Committee on Housing 1989, 23). Such projects make one ponder about the guiding criteria used in allocating Initiative dollars, and recall the paradoxical questions associated with urban regeneration efforts; namely, 'success for whom?' and 'success at what price?' On balance, however, it may be said that the CAI was able to accomplish many of its physical revitalisation objectives, particularly in terms of housing, community facilities and neighbourhood improvement.

The Initiative was less successful in achieving its social and economic objectives. While CAI-sponsored publications laud the exceptionally high completion and placement rates through Initiative job training programs, the balance of opinion suggests that the CAI's efforts in the areas of education and employment only met with moderate success. The private sector was largely unwilling to embrace Initiative job training and placement objectives, and the CAI failed to enforce its affirmative action policies (Dexter and Kowall 1990; Stewart 1993b). In terms of economic development, financial success has been modest at best for the two CAI-sponsored downtown development corporations.

The Notion of Sustainability in Urban Regeneration Efforts

Concept Overview

Revitalisation endeavours may be successful in providing only short-term transitory relief to existing urban problems, or alternately, may bring about more sustained and fundamental change to inner city conditions.

While 'bricks and mortar' projects may indeed change the face of an inner city, it has been shown that true regeneration is only possible through redevelopment of an area's socio-economic as well as physical fabric. Research also shows that leadership capacity, developed through regeneration efforts, and reflected in the range, stability and sustainability of established local methodologies and partnerships, will allow a city to respond proactively to inner city pressures on an ongoing basis.

Sustainability of the CAI Experiment

A 1992 CAI publication states:

“The scope and range of Initiative programs have left a lasting legacy that will touch the lives of Winnipeggers for years to come. The Initiative has helped re-establish the core as a place in which to live, work, shop, invest and enjoy cultural and recreational opportunities. But it is inner city residents that will continue to benefit most” (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1992: 23).

It is certainly true that the CAI has left a legacy in terms of physical development. Most Winnipeggers, in fact, felt that the CAI will be remembered for the physical restoration and development projects it supported (Results Group 1989). Notwithstanding this success, it has been shown that the Initiative’s achievements with respect to social and economic objectives were more modest and transitory. The Initiative did not educe the structural changes required to address systemic poverty, and accordingly, many of the conditions that provided the impetus for undertaking the CAI still prevail in Winnipeg’s inner city.

A review of the Initiative’s leadership capacity as reflected by the range, stability and sustainability of established methodologies and partnerships yields mixed results. On the one hand, there clearly was an absence of long-term funding and other support mechanisms designed to ensure program stability and continuity. The CAI was criticised for continuing to sponsor new initiatives without a clear long-term strategy or assurances of ongoing support. Inner city community support programs and agencies proved to be particularly vulnerable to eroding support towards the CAI’s conclusion. On the other hand, the CAI inarguably facilitated a new and valuable partnership role for the private sector in Winnipeg’s urban regeneration efforts. Given the opinion that the CAI may have engaged the private sector on an individual project basis, as opposed to a ‘big picture’ basis, the sustainability of the private sector role remains to be tested over time. Numerous examples exist of CAI-initiated partnerships that responded to previously unmet social needs and introduced innovative non-traditional approaches to service delivery. The CAI may be seen to have indirectly fostered the creation of new, long-term community-based organisations capable of contributing to local social and economic needs. Perhaps one of the CAI’s most enduring achievements was the establishment of cooperative relationships within and between governments, through which each has been sensitised to the objectives and concerns of others.

Conclusion

This paper set out to contribute to the development of informed policy

formulation and practice in the field of urban regeneration by posing the question "What constitutes success in efforts to address inner city decline?" The paper has attempted to answer this question through a survey and synthesis of policy solutions derived from literature. The paper has utilised a case study of the relative success or failure of a major Canadian urban planning intervention -- the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative -- to illustrate this broader policy framework.

The complexity of inner city decline has resulted in an equally complex array of policy and programmatic responses in the quest to find a single best approach to urban revitalisation. Theory and practice clearly suggest that there is no singular solution -- no magic formula -- to the problem of urban distress. Notwithstanding, an examination of the notion of 'success' relative to urban restructuring suggests that there are, in fact, a number of common critical factors that have been shown to contribute to successful outcomes in urban regeneration efforts. These factors include: an area-based approach to restructuring, a multi-sectoral strategy, a broad long-term planning focus, clearly defined objectives, a supportive structural model, partnerships with key stakeholders, comprehensive information systems, and recognition of the importance of incremental change.

In attempting to adjudicate the relative success of the CAI against this conceptual backdrop, case analysis would suggest that the CAI embodied a number of essential elements underlying successful urban revitalisation efforts, including an area-based, comprehensive multi-sectoral approach to economic and social development, along with recognition of the value of incremental change. The CAI fell short, however, in the absence of a definitive linkage between inner city planning and a city-wide strategy. Its broad objectives and widespread efforts were both strengths and weaknesses. While ambitious and synergistic, it could be argued that they were not representative of, and therefore, could not adequately address inner city needs.

With respect to structure, the CAI's substantive breadth and tri-governmental management/program delivery structure served to demarcate it from other contemporary revitalisation efforts. While the Initiative's tri-lateral model afforded a number of significant advantages, its perceived downsides, particularly during its renewed term, served to reduce the probability of achieving overall objectives. While the Initiative was effective at promoting inter-governmental cooperation, its top-down approach to policy development and implementation largely failed to capitalise on the existing untapped resource base at the community level.

While the CAI reflected the establishment of productive partnerships between government and to a lesser extent, the private sector, it failed to answer repeated calls to expand its partnership model to include meaningful citizen participation. The Initiative's information and monitoring systems stopped short of a comprehensive evaluative framework, thereby weakening the link between research and its role in shaping the well-being of the inner city. While various evaluative studies were conducted, the absence of clearly defined specific

objectives, pre-existing scales of measurement, and a lack of focus on outcomes may have precluded a true picture of the CAI's effectiveness and diminished their effectiveness in informing ongoing policy development and implementation.

Evolving evaluative enterprise in the area of urban revitalisation suggests a number of outcome measurements that may be used to adjudicate the relative success or failure of restructuring efforts. These social, economic and environmental measuring sticks include: education, housing condition and tenure, inner city out-migration, employment, income, crime rate, and local perception. In attempting to analyze the CAI's overall success against these indicators, research would suggest that the Initiative enjoyed considerable success in certain areas, most notably physical redevelopment, and moderate success in terms of economic development. Clearly, however, it fell short of objectives and promises in the critical area of social development. While there is no doubt that the CAI yielded tangible results that could not have been accomplished by any one level of government alone, it appears unlikely that the Initiative substantively halted or reversed prevalent socio-economic conditions of Winnipeg's inner city.

The notion of 'success' in urban restructuring embodies the concept of sustainability. Revitalisation efforts may be successful in providing only short-term transitory relief to existing urban problems, or may in fact, may bring about more sustained and fundamental change to inner city conditions. In attempting to assess whether the impression left by the CAI can be characterised as lasting and strong, research suggests that Initiative's legacy in terms of physical regeneration is unquestioned. Its example of cooperation within and between governments is enduring. While the results of this study indicate that many of the socio-economic conditions which gave rise to the CAI continued to persist in Winnipeg's inner city a decade following the CAI's end, it is important to note that urban problems in any city are profoundly resistant to change. Accordingly, although the mark made by the CAI was neither permanent nor penetrating in terms of bringing about fundamental systemic changes, it did more than just alter the face of downtown Winnipeg. The impression cast by the CAI's creative tri-lateral structure and multi-sectoral approach can be seen to be a forward-looking footprint on the surface of long-standing, complex problems in Winnipeg's inner city; a footprint into which successors to the Initiative may elect to step.

It is hoped that lessons learned from the CAI experience, coupled with teachings from existing literature, can be used to refine our understanding of what constitutes 'success' in the area of urban regeneration and can ultimately lead to more informed policy approaches to ongoing inner city challenges.

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Appendix 1

Case Study Interviews

Contributor	Title
Jim August, Senior Administrative Personnel	General Manager, CAI
Stewart Clatworthy, Program Evaluators	Program Evaluator/Consultant
Darren Lezubski, Non-Governmental Agencies	Planner/Researcher and Social Planning Council of Winnipeg
Dr. Christopher Leo, Observers	Professor Political Science Dept. University of Winnipeg

Note: 1. All interviews occurred in June 1998.